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2024年7月24日，中國(guó)日?qǐng)?bào)（CHINA DAILY）發(fā)表了國(guó)際經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)會(huì)會(huì)士，遼寧大學(xué)黨委副書(shū)記、校長(zhǎng)余淼杰教授的文章《中國(guó)產(chǎn)能過(guò)剩之謎》。文章糾正了“產(chǎn)業(yè)補(bǔ)貼導(dǎo)致產(chǎn)能過(guò)剩，產(chǎn)能過(guò)剩導(dǎo)致傾銷(xiāo)”的錯(cuò)誤觀(guān)念，指出中國(guó)的工業(yè)補(bǔ)貼符合世界貿(mào)易組織的規(guī)定，并強(qiáng)調(diào)中國(guó)出口優(yōu)勢(shì)源于規(guī)模經(jīng)濟(jì)和國(guó)際市場(chǎng)的擴(kuò)展。文章建議中國(guó)應(yīng)大力發(fā)展國(guó)內(nèi)統(tǒng)一市場(chǎng)，以應(yīng)對(duì)美國(guó)的貿(mào)易限制措施。原文如下：

The myth of 'China's overcapacity'

Imposition of anti-dumping tariffs on Chinese green goods will not boost corresponding US industries

 YU MIAOJIE 

 July 24, 2024

Some US economists and politicians have claimed that China has an overcapacity problem, and that the United States must adopt anti-dumping policies because China is dumping its excess capacity into the US. As a result, the Joe Biden administration has recently announced new tariff rates on $18 billion worth of Chinese imports — a 100 percent tariff on Chinese electric vehicle imports, a 50 percent tariff on Chinese
solar cells, and a 25 percent tariff on certain Chinese steel and aluminum imports.

This overcapacity allegation is unfounded. It is critical that the erroneous thinking of "industrial subsidies lead to overcapacity and
overcapacity leads to dumping" should be corrected.

Whether or not there is overcapacity in China depends on how overcapacity is measured. If overcapacity is defined as the difference between potential and actual production, there is overcapacity in China to some extent. However, there is a fundamental difference between the
overcapacity referred to by China and the dumping due to overcapacity claimed by the US.

Overcapacity is a common problem in global economic development. According to our calculations, China's capacity utilization rate is
within the so-called reasonable range, on par with that of the European Union, the US, Brazil and other economies.

The root cause of the current overcapacity in China is the lack of effective demand in the global market. To address this problem, the
government is working to build a unified national market to effectively alleviate the pressure caused by a lack of effective demand in the
world.

Take China's "new three" exports — electric vehicles, lithium batteries and solar cells as an example. Even if China does not export the "new three" products, the US will not be able to export them to seize the market. The reason is not that the US does not have subsidies, but
that the US does not have a whole industry chain to support their production. In other words, China's "new three" products are not winning in the market because of subsidies.

When judging whether subsidies have an impact on exports, the criterion should be whether China's industrial subsidies comply with World
Trade Organization rules. Currently, China's industrial subsidies are mainly subsidies for R&D, which are aimed at incentivizing technological innovation and do not belong to the WTO's prohibited (red light) subsidy category. Furthermore, the beneficiaries of the subsidies cover
enterprises with different ownership structures including State-owned enterprises, private enterprises, and foreign-funded enterprises.

China has strong export power, with a total foreign trade volume of around 41 trillion yuan ($5.6 trillion) and the largest export volume in the world. China's strong capabilities in exports are first and foremost because of the comparative advantage of Chinese goods, which are
cheaper than others and highly competitive. Second, China has made good use of a large and ever-expanding international market. Comparative
advantage can explain the difference between the Global South and the Global North. Exporting labor-intensive products is because of China's
lower labor costs. But comparative advantage is not the whole story.

The strength of Chinese exports stems from stepped-up economies of scale. That is to say, when exporters make the market bigger and lower the fixed costs of companies, they can sell more and earn more. So it's not because of Chinese subsidies. In other words, even industries that are not subsidized at all in China can export a lot to other countries, which is a strong rebuttal to the "overcapacity" allegation.

The US' so-called overcapacity allegations and the anti-dumping measures taken by the US have insufficient evidence and unjustified intensity.

First, there is insufficient evidence. Chinese automobiles have not caused substantial harm to the US' domestic automobile industry.
Chinese exports of new energy vehicles to the US accounted for a meager 1 percent of total US auto sales, a proportion that is certainly not
sufficient to cause substantial harm to the US domestic auto industry. In fact, the challenges facing the US auto industry stem mainly from
the hollowing out of US industry and the incomplete value chain, which constrain the development of its auto industry, rather than simply
because of competition with cars imported from China.

Second, the intensity of anti-dumping measures is unreasonable. The average tax rate of the US is around 37 percent. Defining China as a
non-market economy and charging anti-dumping duties of up to 100 percent on new energy automobiles imported from China is obviously highly
unreasonable.

China should deal with anti-dumping measures taken by the US by vigorously developing a unified domestic market.

Cultivating new quality productive forces and eliminating backward ones is obviously one direction. Another direction is to actively
cultivate a large domestic market. Among the three main drivers of economic growth, investment is certainly the most objective and practical
way to boost the economy in the short run. Given the current global environment, exports are not the main driver of economic growth. Using
domestic consumption to drive economic growth is certainly desirable, but consumption is insufficient at present. Fostering consumption takes time. Without income growth, it's impossible to boost consumption. Therefore, the most effective way to boost growth in the short run is to
stimulate investment.

作者簡(jiǎn)介

余淼杰，男，漢族，1976年生，教授，博士生導(dǎo)師，美國(guó)戴維斯加利福尼亞大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)博士，現(xiàn)任第十四屆全國(guó)人大代表、國(guó)家監(jiān)委特約監(jiān)察員、遼寧省人大常委會(huì)委員、遼寧省人大立法委委員、遼寧大學(xué)黨委副書(shū)記、校長(zhǎng)。是聯(lián)合國(guó)國(guó)際經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)會(huì)（IEA）會(huì)士，長(zhǎng)江學(xué)者特聘教授（2019年）、首屆青年長(zhǎng)江學(xué)者（2015年）、國(guó)家杰青基金獲得者、北京市卓越青年科學(xué)家、北京大學(xué)博雅特聘教授、 商務(wù)部經(jīng)貿(mào)政策咨詢(xún)委員、財(cái)政部“中美研究智庫(kù)聯(lián)盟”理事、俄羅斯伊爾庫(kù)茨克國(guó)立大學(xué)名譽(yù)教授、俄羅斯聯(lián)邦財(cái)政金融大學(xué)國(guó)際顧問(wèn)理事。系中國(guó)世界經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)會(huì)副會(huì)長(zhǎng)、中國(guó)數(shù)量經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)會(huì)副會(huì)長(zhǎng)、中國(guó)工業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)會(huì)副理事長(zhǎng)、全國(guó)港澳研究會(huì)副會(huì)長(zhǎng)、遼寧省社科聯(lián)副主席、黃廷方/信和青年杰出學(xué)者、全球經(jīng)管類(lèi)前1%高引論文經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)者，也是迄今為止唯一獲得“英國(guó)皇家經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)獎(jiǎng)”的華人學(xué)者。被聯(lián)合國(guó)、亞洲發(fā)展銀行、財(cái)政部、商務(wù)部、國(guó)務(wù)院參事室和多個(gè)地方政府聘為專(zhuān)家顧問(wèn)，被專(zhuān)門(mén)邀請(qǐng)到聯(lián)合國(guó)總部做中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展報(bào)告。享受?chē)?guó)務(wù)院政府特殊津貼。

余淼杰教授研究領(lǐng)域?yàn)閲?guó)際貿(mào)易和中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展，曾在Economic Journal、Review of Economics & Statistics、Journal of International Economics、
Journal of Development Economics、《經(jīng)濟(jì)研究》《管理世界》等國(guó)內(nèi)外頂級(jí)、一流期刊上發(fā)表論文近二百篇，出版中英德文專(zhuān)著、教材、時(shí)評(píng)隨筆27部。任國(guó)際著名學(xué)術(shù)期刊Review of International Economics 副主編，商務(wù)部《國(guó)際貿(mào)易》名譽(yù)主編，《遼寧大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào)》主編、《日本研究》主編、《長(zhǎng)安大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào)》執(zhí)行主編。

曾獲得教育部哲學(xué)社科優(yōu)秀成果獎(jiǎng)（三次）、北京市哲學(xué)社科優(yōu)秀成果獎(jiǎng)、吳玉章人文社科研究獎(jiǎng)、張培剛發(fā)展經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)獎(jiǎng)，安子介國(guó)際貿(mào)易研究獎(jiǎng)（五次）。代表著作《加工貿(mào)易與企業(yè)生產(chǎn)率》獲劉詩(shī)白經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)獎(jiǎng)、胡繩青年學(xué)術(shù)研究獎(jiǎng)、全國(guó)貿(mào)易發(fā)展研究獎(jiǎng)、中國(guó)青年經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家獎(jiǎng)、遼寧省哲學(xué)社會(huì)科學(xué)獎(jiǎng)成就獎(jiǎng)等。

在北大百廿校慶中，作為優(yōu)秀中青年教師代表受到習(xí)近平總書(shū)記的專(zhuān)門(mén)接見(jiàn)。作為國(guó)家杰青25周年優(yōu)秀代表參加時(shí)任國(guó)務(wù)院總理李克強(qiáng)主持的高規(guī)格座談會(huì)。
2024年作為全國(guó)人大青年代表團(tuán)成員（共8名）訪(fǎng)問(wèn)俄羅斯聯(lián)邦議會(huì)及地方杜馬。